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 Political philosophy
 and the theory of
 international relations
 DAVID S. YOST
 The recently published lectures by Martin Wight (1913-72) on the history of Western
 thought regarding international politics are of exceptional importance. As David Yost
 points out, the lectures answer a number of questions about what Wight meant by
 'traditions' and what his own position was with regard to their validity. Wight's
 analysis and organizing framework capture and clarify a complex historical reality with
 greater justice and lucidity than many others that have been proposed. Moreover, the
 lectures place in perspective what has been the most indisputable criticism of Wight's
 approach-his 'Eurocentrism' and neglect of non-Western traditions-and illustrate
 opportunitiesforfurther research building on thesefoundations.*
 Martin Wight was, as Adam Roberts has noted, 'perhaps the most profound
 thinker on international relations of his generation of British academics'.1 Much
 of Wight's influence has stemmed from his lectures on the theory of inter-
 national relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science in
 the 195os. The lectures have been known mainly through the writings of
 Hedley Bull and Brian Porter, who attended them and had access to Wight's
 notes after his death.2
 Wight's publications on this subject during his lifetime were limited to a
 pamphlet and a few articles and book chapters,3 and his most extensive works
 The views expressed are the author's alone and do not represent those of the US Department of the
 Navy or any US government agency. Special thanks are owed to those who commented on the first
 draft of this essay: Pierre Hassner, Stanley Hoffmann, ArthurJ. Knodel, Andrew W. Marshall, Lawrence
 W. Martin, Adam Roberts, John Roper, James V. Schall, S. J.,Thomas J. Welch and Gabriele Wight.
 Adam Roberts, 'Foreword', in Martin Wight, International theory: the three traditions, Gabriele Wight and
 Brian Porter, eds (Leicester and London: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International
 Affairs, I99I and paperback edition April I994), p. xxiv. Subsequent page references to this work are
 given in parentheses in the text.
 2 Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', British Journal of International
 Studies, 2, July I976, pp. ioi-i6; Brian Porter, 'Patterns of thought and practice: Martin Wight's
 international theory', in Michael Donelan, ed., The reason of states: a study in international political theory
 (London: Allen and Unwin, I978).
 3 See, above all, Martin Wight, Power politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, I946);
 'Western values in international relations', 'The balance of power' and 'Why is there no international
 theory?', all in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds, Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of
 international politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I966); and 'The balance of power and
 international order', in AlanJames, ed., The bases of international order: essays in honour of C. A. W. Manning
 (London: Oxford University Press, I973).
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 concerned the history of British colonialism.4 Indeed, only one book chapter-
 his classic essay, 'Western values in international relations'-outlined Wight's
 path-breaking organization of the history of Western thinking about inter-
 national politics into three categories, or traditions.5 Three books by Wight have
 been published posthumously: Systems of states in I977,6 Power politics in I978,7
 and International theory: the three traditions in i99i. The last of these is based on
 Wight's notes for the widely discussed lectures given in the I950s, on which his
 wife Gabriele worked with Brian Porter to prepare a publishable text that is, in
 her words, 'as true to the original as possible', with 'no additions and few
 omissions' (p. vi).
 Wight's lectures are important because much of the theoretical literature about
 international politics is pitched at an abstract and general level. Policy-oriented
 students find it hard to imagine that such works can offer much help in
 understanding the choices and interactions of governments and organizations,
 of politicians, diplomats, soldiers, and so forth. Wight, however, was a historian
 who grounded his findings about theory and philosophy in solid scholarship
 about how specific thinkers and policy-makers interpreted events in concrete
 historical contexts. His analysis-compact, aphoristic and richly documented-
 provides a robust and unequalled guide to the history of Western thought about
 the fundamental questions of international politics. The conceptual antecedents
 of current debates are outlined with great erudition and clarity. Wight's pro-
 found and acute observations illuminate past conceptual frameworks and, in
 several cases, their continuing relevance as an inspiration for analysis and action.
 Wight's work vividly evokes the central frameworks of Western statecraft,
 including recurrences, adjustments and never-resolved dilemmas and paradoxes.
 His analysis teaches us humility about our 'originality' and about the limits of
 the theoretical enterprise.
 Wight's analysis
 Wight held that 'international theory is the political philosophy of international
 relations' (p. i). He suggested three reasons for the dominance of state-centred
 theorizing in Western political philosophy since the sixteenth century. First,
 during the period from the fourteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century,
 Martin Wight, The development of the Legislative Council, 1606-1945 (London: Faber & Faber, I946); The
 Gold Coast Legislative Council (London: Faber & Faber, I947); and British colonial constitutions 1947
 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I952).
 A short article on the same theme, a lecture given by Wight in Geneva in I960, was published in I987:
 Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', Review of International Studies I3, July I987, pp.
 22I-7. Wight published little of his work, Bull observed, because he was a 'perfectionist' who believed
 (in Albert Wohlstetter's phrase) 'in a high ratio of thought to publication'. Bull, 'Martin Wight and the
 theory of international relations', p. ioi.
 6 Martin Wight, Systems of states, ed. Hedley Bull (London: Leicester University Press in association with
 the London School of Economics and Political Science, I977). For background, see David S. Yost,
 'New perspectives on historical states-systems', World Politics 32, October I979, pp. I5I-68.
 7 Martin Wight, Power politics, eds Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (London: Leicester University Press
 for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, I978). This is a revised and expanded version of the I946
 pamphlet with the same title, which was unfinished at the time of Wight's death (see note 3 above).
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 many Europeans saw the main political task as building sovereign states that
 would provide domestic order and security from foreign enemies and that
 would acknowledge no feudal obligations nor any political superior, despite the
 claims of the Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire. Second,
 the Renaissance rediscovery of Graeco-Roman civilization-including the
 writings of Plato-reinforced the inclination to consider the sovereign state the
 proper form of political organization, because much of classical political philo-
 sophy concerns the polis, the self-governing city-state. Third, during the wars of
 religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Protestants and humanists
 developed arguments in support of state sovereignty and autonomy independent
 of any external power, partly to erode the lingering medieval pretensions to
 universal authority of the Catholic Church. Such arguments were found useful
 by Catholic sovereigns interested in justifying the absoluteness of their own
 powers. Subsequent political philosophy in the West has been in large part
 concerned with the struggle for constitutionalism-that is, checks and balances
 to control the exertion of state powers.
 The theoretical literature about international politics has accordingly been
 sparse and scattered. Three main sources nonetheless stand out, in Wight's view.
 First, some authorities on international law-including Grotius and the great
 Spanish neo-scholastics such as Suarez and Vitoria-wrote works of continuing
 relevance. Second, some political philosophers-notably, Kant, Rousseau,
 Hume and Tocqueville-devoted some works to international politics. Third,
 some practising politicians-for instance, Machiavelli, Burke, Bismarck,
 Lincoln, Churchill, Lenin and Woodrow Wilson-outlined their thinking in
 histories, memoirs, treatises, speeches or other statements.
 Wight described the lectures as 'in the first place an experiment in classification,
 in typology, and in the second an exploration of continuity and recurrence, a
 study in the uniformity of political thought; and its leading premiss is that
 political ideas do not change much, and the range of ideas is limited' (p. 5).
 Wight apparently derived part of his inspiration from an observation in i852 by
 Tocqueville: 'It is unbelievable how many systems of morals and politics have
 been successively found, forgotten, rediscovered, forgotten again, to reappear a
 little later, always charming and surprising the world as if they were new, and
 bearing witness, not to the fecundity of the human spirit, but to the ignorance
 of men.' Tocqueville went on to argue, Wight noted, that it would be possible,
 'by studying the most illustrious writers who have engaged in moral and
 political studies throughout the centuries, to rediscover what are the principal
 ideas in these fields which have been in circulation among the human race-to
 reduce them to quite a small number of systems-and so to compare them with
 one another and to passjudgment on them' (pp. 5-6). This is the challenge Wight
 undertook in these lectures, concentrating on the period since Machiavelli.
 As the book's title indicates, Wight concluded that the writers and ideas could
 be placed into three traditions: Realists, Rationalists, and Revolutionists, names
 that 'do not sacrifice accuracy in any degree to the charms of alliteration' (p. 7).
 Realists, or Machiavellians, emphasize the anarchical elements of international
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 politics: 'sovereign states acknowledging no political superior, whose relation-.
 ships are ultimately regulated by warfare'. Rationalists, or Grotians, concentrate
 on 'diplomacy and commerce' and other institutions for 'continuous and organ-
 ized intercourse between these sovereign states'. Revolutionists, or Kantians,
 underscore the 'concept of a society of states, or faimily of nations' and pursue
 the realization of an imperative vision of the moral unity of mankind (pp. 7-8).
 Realist views have been advanced by philosophers such as Bacon and Hobbes
 and by policy-makers such as Frederick the Great and Napoleon. Realists have
 tended to deny the existence of international moral and legal obligations based
 on natural law, and have appealed-implicitly, if not explicitlyo pnnciples of
 expediency such as justification by success.
 Rationalists have been closely associated with Western traditions of consti-
 tutional government. Philosophers such as Aristode and Locke and politicians
 such as Burke, Gladstone, Lincoln and Churchill have usually taken Rationalist
 positions, holding that moral obligations rooted in natural law (and discernible
 by reason) should be respected. Rationalists have also emphasized the moral
 tensions and difficulties involved in limiting power and in identifying the lesser
 evil in specific situations.
 The most prominent examples of Revolutionist thinking include the Protes-
 tant and Catholic factions in the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth
 centuries, each asserting rights and duties to intervene in other states to promote
 the success of their own doctrines; the intellectual forefithers of the French
 Revolution, such as Rousseau, and its leaders, particularly the Jacobins; the
 champions of 'ideological uniformity' as a path to intemational order and
 security, such as Kant, Mazzini and Woodrow Wilson; the proponents of a
 gradual convergence of interests through commerce and a consensus of world
 public opinion, such as Cobden and Bright; and totalitarian ideologues, both
 communists and fascists, who have tried to impose their conceptions through
 conquest and coercion. Revolutionists have tended to argue that the end
 justifies the means, or that political ethics must be identical to those of pnrvate
 life.
 After providing an initial definition and discussion of each tradition, Wight
 devoted separate lectures to how the three traditions have dealt with finda-
 mental issues: human nature; international society; relations with non-European
 'barbarians'; national power; national interest; foreign policy; the balance of
 power; diplomacy; war; and international law, obligation and ethics. Each
 tradition is rooted in distinct premisses that shape the interpretation of events
 and help to define prescriptions for action.
 What Wight meant by 'traditions'
 The lectures clarify what Wight meant by the word 'traditions' and the extent to
 which, in his judgement, each tradition displays intellectual continuity. It is the
 Realists and Rationalists, he held, who have drawn on coherent intellectual
 traditions. The Rationalists have travelled 'the road with the most conscious
 266
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 acknowledgment of continuity', beginning with 'the Greeks and especially the
 Stoics' and proceeding down a broad path with many representatives, including
 Aquinas, Grotius, Madison, Tocquevilie and Lincoln (pp. I4-I5). The Realist
 tradition is 'virtually as self-conscious and as continuous as the Rationalist', with
 Machiavelli's approach an example for Bacon, Hobbes, Frederick the Great,
 Bismarck, E. H. Carr and others (pp. I6-17). In contrast, 'the Revolutionist
 ancestry of ideas and continuity of thought is ambiguous or uncertain. The
 Revolutionist tradition is less a stream than a series of waves ... [or] disconnected
 illustrations of the same politico-philosophical truths... It is characteristic of
 Revolutionism ... to deny its past, to try to start from scratch, to jump out of
 history and begin again' (p. 12).
 One of the criticisms made of Wight's outline of the three traditions, mainly
 as reported by Bull and Porter, was that they were Procrustean and could not do
 justice to individual philosophers and policy-makers. As Roy Jones noted in
 I98I, 'There was more than one side to Machiavelli after all.'8 The lectures
 reveal that Wight made the same point in the I95Os: 'Machiavelli was inspired
 to write by a passion foreign to the principles of his theory-a passion which
 breaks out in the last chapter of The Prince' (pp. 259-60). Furthermore, Wight
 cited examples of 'how far Machiavelli was from cheap Machiavellianism, and
 how his recommendations are more penetrating, and one jump ahead, of his
 self-appointed disciples' (p. isi). Similarly, Wight noted that Kant himself
 rejected 'the Revolutionary Kantian principle . . . that the end justifies the
 means' (p. I62).
 Wight gave many other examples of specific philosophers and decision-
 makers who cannot be confined to a single tradition. He noted, for instance,
 that Aristotle, forerunner of much of the Rationalist tradition of constitutional
 government (pp. 109, 129), taught the Realist principl;e that 'barbarians, non-
 Greeks, were slaves by nature' and fit to be subjugated (pp. 51-2). Wight
 repeatedly noted that 'the three traditions are not clear-cut pigeon-holes, but
 can overlap' (p. I5). He compared the traditions to colours that might be mixed
 across a spectrum (p. 2I6) and to 'streams, with eddies and cross-currents,
 sometimes interlacing . .. They both influence and cross-fertilize one another,
 and they change, although without, I think, losing their inner identity' (p. 260).
 In other words, his work was 'an attempt to pin down and define the central
 principles and characteristic doctrines of each of the three traditions' (p. 258,
 emphasis in original).
 After one particularly incisive summary of the essential differences between
 the three traditions, Wight declared that
 all this is merely classification and schematizing. In all political and historical studies
 the purpose of building pigeon-holes is to reassure oneself that the raw material does
 not fit into them. Classification becomes valuable, in humane studies, only at the point
 8 Roy E. Jones, 'The English school of international relations: a case for closure', Review of International
 Studies 7,Jan. I98I, p. io.
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 where it breaks down. The greatest political writers in international theory almost all
 straddle the frontiers dividing two of the traditions, and most of these writers transcend
 their own systems. (p. 259, emphasis in original)
 Furthermore, to be faithful to the historical evidence, Wight identified sub-
 categories and anomalies in the three main traditions. For instance, he distin-
 guished 'soft' Revolutionists, such as Kant and Wilson, from 'hard' Revolu-
 tionists such as the Jacobins and Marxist-Leninists: in contrast with the gradual
 and legalistic approach of the former, the latter have championed the use of
 violence to bring about a transformation of world politics (pp. 46-47, 267). He
 also suggested that 'if Realism is defined by the classic Realists-Machiavelli,
 Richelieu, Hobbes, Hume, Frederick ii, Hegel-then contemporary Realists
 appear as much Rationalist as Realist'; and he cited statements by George F.
 Kennan and Hans Morgenthau as examples (p. 267).9
 Wight also discussed a fourth tradition, historically of lesser importance,
 which he called 'inverted Revolutionism'-a tradition 'of whom pacifists are the
 chief, although not the only, example' (p. 254). The goal of this approach,
 notably as expounded by the Quakers, is 'evoking the latent power of love in all
 people, and transforming the world by the transformation of souls' (p. 257). 'It
 is "inverted" because it repudiates the use of power altogether; it is "Revolu-
 tionist" because it sees this repudiation as a principle of universal validity, and
 energetically promotes its acceptance' (p. io8). Wight maintained that inverted
 Revolutionism usually partakes of 'a Realist analysis of politics', giving examples
 such as Tolstoy's War and peace and early Quaker statements comparing men to
 'raging lions' (pp. 19-20, 109-1O).
 In short, by 'tradition' Wight did not mean that new adherents to a way of
 thinking have always been strongly influenced and even guided by the analyses
 formulated by their predecessors, with certain sets of ideas developed with great
 continuity and deliberation over centuries. The Revolutionist 'tradition' in
 particular has been marked by profound discontinuities. Even within the tradi-
 tions with a greater degree of cohesion (the Realists and the Rationalists),
 individual analysts and policy-makers have rediscovered and rethought old
 principles for themselves and have devised approaches extending beyond the
 notional limits of the tradition. Thus, the traditions are not straitjackets, but
 organizing frameworks used to group closely related and often interdependent
 ideas together.
 9 For a comparable judgement about the moral as well as pragmatic concerns of some contemporary
 realists, see the incisive essay by Robert G. Gilpin, 'The richness of the tradition of political realism', in
 Robert 0. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its critics (New York: Columbia University Press, I986).
 Churchill offered a brilliant combination of Realist and Rationalist themes in his March 1936 speech on
 the enduring principles of British foreign policy, reproduced in The gathering storm, vol. I of The Second
 World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), pp. 207-I0.
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 Wight's own position
 Wight concentrated on the first part of Tocqueville's challenge, and-with
 regard to Western societies, at least-he succeeded in his attempt 'to delimit the
 scope of international theory, to mark out its boundaries, stake its circle' and
 thus to demonstrate that 'the great moral debates of the past are in essence our
 debates' (p. 268). Wight was generally less explicit in carrying out the second
 part of Tocqueville's challenge-'to pass judgment' on the main traditions of
 thinking about international relations. Wight's exposition was often detached,
 with a clear striving to provide a balanced analysis of each tradition.
 Perhaps partly because of works such as his 1946 pamphlet Power politics and
 his essays on the balance of power, many have assumed that Wight was a Realist.
 In 1982, Alan James wrote, 'As a teacher and writer Wight falls unambiguously
 into the category which is widely termed, not least by himself, realist.'l0 Hedley
 Bull, however, suggested that 'if we had to put Martin Wight into one or another
 of his own three pigeon-holes there is no doubt that we should have to consider
 him a Grotian', partly because of this tradition's via media qualities and its
 recognition of the moral complexity of international relations. But, Bull contin-
 ued, 'it would be wrong to force Martin Wight into the Grotian pigeon-hole. It
 is a truer view of him to regard him as standing outside the three traditions,
 feeling the attraction of each of them but unable to come to rest within any one
 of them, and embodying in his own life and thought the tension among them.'
 Even though 'the Grotian elements in his thinking became stronger' over the
 years, 'Wight was too well aware of the vulnerability of the Grotian position ever
 to commit himself to it fully'. The main vulnerability of the Grotian position,
 Bull suggested, is that it may be a luxury available only to the strongest and most
 satisfied powers, which may adopt Rationalist legal and moral positions as
 instruments to protect acquisitions made through Realist means.11
 The lectures offer evidence to support all these judgements. Wight denied any
 intention of trying to make a case for one of the traditions: 'In this course of
 lectures I have not wanted to favour any particular international theory' (p.
 267). At one point, however, he wrote, 'Realists . . . emphasize in international
 relations the element of anarchy, of power-politics, and of warfare. Everyone is
 a Realist nowadays, and the term in this sense needs no argument' (p. I5).
 Elsewhere he described Rationalism as 'a road on which I suppose all of us, in
 certain moods, feel we really belong' (p. 14). In the last paragraph of the book,
 Wight indicated: 'I find my own position shifting round the circle. You will have
 guessed that my prejudices are Rationalist, but I find I have become more
 Rationalist and less Realist through rethinking this question during the course
 of giving these lectures' (p. 268).
 1 Alan James, 'Michael Nicholson on Martin Wight: a mind passing in the night', Review of International
 Studies 8, April I982, p. II8.
 Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', pp. I07-8. This essay is reproduced at the
 beginning of International theory: the three traditions-in a slighdy abridged form, unfortunately. The
 citations here refer to the complete original version.
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 Indeed, the lectures include implicit judgements on some Realists as cynical
 and amoral and on the 'hard' Revolutionists as fanatical and ready to commit
 atrocities in the name of their vision. Wight discussed in some detail historical
 examples of Realist endorsements of raison d'e'tat principles of fraud, deception,
 and betrayal in seizing opportunities to eliminate adversaries, to conquer the
 vulnerable or to gain other advantages. Some Realists have defined such acts as
 morally neutral means to advance the interests of the state. Wight commented:
 'That is, shoot first and litigate afterwards' (p. 246). Without explicitly
 condemning such Realists, Wight wrote: 'To regard politics as the sphere of the
 non-moral is in effect to regard it as the sphere of the immoral. This is the
 implication of Cavour's famous saying: "If we were to do for ourselves, what we
 are doing for Italy, we should be great rogues."' (p. 247).
 Wight was less inhibited in revealing his reservations about the Revolutionists,
 particularly those determined to exterminate people unwilling to accept their
 vision of a redeemed humanity. Wight noted that some Revolutionists
 use extermination not just as an instrument of policy, but as a matter of principle:
 earlier Revolutionists would have said, as a matter of duty; contemporary ones would
 say, 'scientifically'. To go back to the Albigensian Crusade, the first crusade turned
 against Christendom itself; at the Sack of Beziers in I209, the cry was: 'Kill them. For
 God will know his own.' This terrible saying has echoed down the centuries, with
 different variations of the same theme. (p. 225)
 Examples include the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
 the wars of the French Revolution (especially the civil conflicts within France
 itself) and the vast extermination programmes conducted by totalitarian
 regimes, notably Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Wight observed: 'It is
 really an extreme form of optimism to believe that by decimating the human
 race you can make the residue virtuous, and that such methods will not affect
 the results' (p. 28).
 Wight offered few criticisms of the Rationalists, but noted that some of their
 principles could readily be abused. 'Thus almost the same pious form of words
 can be used . . . not only to justify not abdicating an [overseas colonial]
 administration ... on the grounds that the political order would disappear and
 anarchy would result with a vast increase in suffering (Burke's argument); but
 also to justify extending a government by annexing a new province' (p. 77).
 Moreover, Rationalists have tended to avert their eyes from unpleasant truths
 underscored by the Realists.
 All states and nations, even welfare states, have been built by struggle and war. Hence
 the radical ambiguity of a position like that of the Western powers after I9g9, who after
 a successful career as burglars tried to settle down as country-gentlemen making
 intermittent appearances on the magistrate's bench. One can ask whether they ever
 found the theoretical, moral answer to the Realist critique levelled at them by Axis
 propaganda: that they had got where they were by struggle; that they could not
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 contract out of the struggle at a moment that happened to suit them; and still less could
 they justify and protect themselves in an attempt at contracting out of it by appealing
 to sets of moral principles which they had ignored when they were committed to the
 struggle. (p. 2IO)
 By clarifying Wight's own position, the lectures provide a response to another
 question that has been raised repeatedly: whether Wight retained in his maturity
 the pacifist positions he championed as a young man. In an article published in
 I936, when he was 22 years old, he outlined the arguments for Christian
 pacifism and the shortcomings of the just war doctrine in a historical and
 theological perspective; and in 194o he declared himself a conscientious
 objector.'2 Although Bull and Porter, in their descriptions of Wight's then
 unpublished lectures, had mentioned Wight's discussion of pacifism as a form of
 'inverted Revolutionism','3 critics such as Michael Nicholson complained that
 'pacifism is a central moral problem which is not dealt with in Wight's later [that
 is, post-Second World War] writing'. Wight was thus accused of inconsistency:
 'The problem of reconciling Wight, the power politician with Wight the pacifist
 is a delicate operation to put it mildly."14
 Bull concluded that pacifism was evidendy only an early phase of Wight's
 thinking- 'As Wight grew older his pacifism appears to have dropped away; those
 who met him in later life found no inkling of it in his views."5 Alan James has
 argued, as noted earlier, that Wight's analysis of international politics was
 Realist; butJames has also suggested that Wight may have nonetheless remained
 a pacifist in his private convictions. According to James, 'there is no evidence
 that he abandoned this position' [that is, pacifismi, and 'he may just have drifted
 away from pacifism, while still accepting its theological validity.'"6 Gabriele
 Wight has reported, however, that 'Martin himself in his own c.v. publications
 lists never included that article.'"7 She has added that 'Martin never, I enquired
 extensively from fiiends of that time, referred to the conscientious objection
 ever again; neither still during the war nor later; neither to very close Christian
 friends or others, nor to colleagues nor to me'.'8
 In the lectures it appears that Wight later associated at least some approaches to
 pacifism with Revolutionist visions of messianic fulfilment and permanent
 progress in this world, visions about which he expressed profound scepticism.
 Wight described the inverted Revolutionist tradition, including pacifism, as
 accurately and sympathetically as possible, but his conmments imply an ultimately
 negative judgement because of the 'difficulties' it presents. To begin with,
 12 Martin Wight, 'Christian pacifism', Theology 33, July 1936, pp. i2-2I. Wight's application of May 1940
 is cited at length in Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', in Wight,
 Systems of states, p. 4.
 '3 BuUl, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. Io6; Porter, 'Patterns of thought and
 practice', p. 68.
 '4 Michael Nicholson, 'The enigma of Martin Wight', Retiew of International Studies 7' Jan. i98i, p. I8.
 5 Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. s.
 tJames, 'Michael Nicholson on Martin Wight', pp. I17-23.
 l7 Letter from Gabriele Wight to the author, 17 Sept. I993; emphasis in original.
 '8 Letter from Gabriele Wight to the author, 22 Nov. 1993.
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 Adopting the perfectionist ethic (asserting that the way of testimony is greater than the
 way of compromise, and the principle of meliorism greater than that of choosing the
 lesser evil), in the hope of escaping from the ambiguities and cutting through the
 entanglements of political ethics, nevertheless leads speedily back again to the maze of
 the double standard. (p. 256)
 As a result, the inverted Revolutionist may be led to a quietist 'withdrawal into
 the sphere of the private ethic, and repudiation of the political sphere alto-
 gether', or to 'a doctrine which seems, to the external critic, to carry the
 impulse to revise one's practice upwards to the point where one's feet lose
 contact with the earth. The repudiation of the principle of lesser evil can
 become the pursuit of the illusory alternative' (pp. 256-7).19
 Wight's implicit rejection of pacifism in his maturity should have already been
 clear from his publications during his lifetime. In the I96os, he wrote that the
 Grotian tradition represents 'the juste milieu between definable extremes'. He
 cited, among other examples, 'the policy of collective security between the
 World Wars as a middle way between the pacifists and disarmers on the one side
 and the imperialists turned appeasers on the other', and the statement by Grotius
 that 'A remedy must be found for those that believe that in war nothing is lawful,
 and for those for whom all things are lawful in war'.20
 Assessing criticisms of Wight's analysis
 No doubt because Wight never found the time to prepare the lecture notes for
 publication himself, the terminology is not always consistent and some passages
 seem sketchy and unfinished-for example, with regard to the relative strengths
 of the traditions during certain periods of history since the late fifteenth century
 (pp. I 62-3). It is reasonable to speculate that, had Wight reworked the passages
 dealing with the twentieth-century totalitarian Revolutionists, he would have
 developed further the differences as well as the similarities, along the lines
 indicated in his historical works. Wight once pointed out, for instance, follow-
 ing Franz Borkenau, that fascists made statements about what they deemed the
 probable duration of their dominance (such as Mussolini's claim for a fascist
 century and Hitler's assertions about a thousand-year Reich), whereas
 communists would not admit of any end-point for their triumph.21
 More fundamentally, Wight might well have chosen to elaborate on his
 comments about Hitler and Mussolini and other fascists, and to make their
 It might also bc noted that Wight's refcrcncc to pacifism in analysing British appeascmcnt policies in thc
 T930S is hardly positive (p. 265).
 20 Wight, 'Western values in international relations', p. 9T.
 21 Martin Wight, 'Thc balance of power', in Arnold Toynbee, cd., The wvorld iti March 1939 (London: Oxford
 University Press, T952), pp. ST6n, 52Tn. Thc 'three-cornered dialogue' in this essay, based on statements
 by thc German and Italian fascists, thc Soviet communists, and thc Wcstcrn powers (reprcsented mainly
 by Britain and France), underlines a number of contrasts and commonalities in thc fascist and
 communist positions. Thc similarities cxtend beyond thc opportunism of fascist and communist party
 elites claiming a Rousseauite type of 'general will' legitimacy.
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 differences from the Soviet communists more evident. Statements or decisions
 by Hitler are cited as examples of both Realism (pp. 3", I69, 172, 2IO) and
 Revolutionism (pp. 43, ii8). The communists held forth visions of a future
 utopia, a world without war or oppression; but it is not apparent how the
 Revolutionist principle of the moral unity of mankind could be reconciled with
 fascist 'master race' claims. In one passage Nazi racism is described as 'on the
 border-line between Revolutionism and Realism' (p. 65), and in another fascists
 are held to 'show characteristics of both ways of thought' (p. 215). In several
 respects, Wight suggested, the fascist ideologies partook both of 'extreme' Realism
 and of 'hard' Revolutionism (for instance, in glorifying war and rejecting
 Rationalist international moral and legal obligations); and Wight might have
 developed this theme in greater depth if he had had the opportunity to do so.
 Sometimes the unfinished quality of the work is evident in clear contra-
 dictions. At one point, for example, Wight asserted that 'all Revolutionism is of
 a Christian pattern, whether Rousseauite or Marxist . .. The ancient world has
 no tradition of political thought comparable to Revolutionism' (p. IO9). In
 another discussion of the possible intellectual origins of Revolutionism, how-
 ever, Wight referred to (a) the Revolutionist 'doctrinal imperialism' implicit in
 the Old Testament concept of a 'chosen people', a concept adopted by Puritan
 England and various other societies, and (b) the extraordinary Revolutionist
 impact of Virgil's Aeneid, an epic that 'has influenced European history more
 deeply than any book except the Bible'. The Aeneid, Wight noted, was 'the
 supreme expression of the imperial mission of Rome; and belief in this mission
 influenced Augustus and pervaded medieval culture' (pp. 43-4). Moreover,
 Wight also discussed the Revolutionist 'concept of the brotherhood of
 mankind', first expounded by Alexander the Great, and developed by Stoic
 philosophers such as Zeno and Marcus Aurelius (pp. 83-4).
 Despite their somewhat unfinished character, the lectures form a coherent
 whole. Their publication therefore makes it possible to judge whether Wight's
 work deserved the criticisms directed against it. According to Bull, for example,
 Wight was .. . too ambitious in attributing to the Machiavellians, the Grotians and the
 Kantians distinctive views not only about war, peace, diplomacy, intervention and
 other matters of International Relations but about human psychology, about irony and
 tragedy, about methodology and epistemology. There is a point at which the debate
 Wight is describing ceases to be one that has actually taken place, and becomes one
 that he has invented; at this point his work is not an exercise in the history of ideas, so
 much as the exposition of an imaginary philosophical conversation, in the manner of
 Plato's dialogues.22
 The published lectures reveal that this analogy is strikingly evocative but not
 entirely just. Wight underscored contrasts between the traditions as paradigms or
 ideal types, but he was too conscientious a historian to invent a dialogue
 22 Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. I I I.
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 decoupled from actual events. He identified observable differences in philo-
 sophies, policies and assumptions; and he grounded his judgements in specific
 and carefully documented facts. He rarely offered a generalization about abstract
 principles without backing it up with at least one, and often several, historical
 examples. Moreover, the published lectures do not include any discussions of
 'irony and tragedy', much less efforts to relate them to each tradition. Nor is any
 attempt made to attribute distinct views about psychology to each tradition. The
 few references to psychology mostly concern Freud's statement that 'the ten-
 dency to aggression is an innate independent instinctual disposition in man' -a
 view that Wight categorized as a Realist judgement about human nature (pp.
 21, 25). The brief but pointed distinctions Wight offered about 'methodology
 and epistemology' centre on the philosophical approach to history that each
 tradition tends to favour and thus the characteristic types of statements made
 within each tradition.
 Wight suggested, for instance, that Realists generally view history as cyclical
 and repetitive and hence a reliable source of lessons for the guidance of astute
 policy-makers. Revolutionists are prone 'to see history as linear, moving up-
 wards towards an apocalyptic denouement' and 'messianic fulfilment', the
 triumph of the true faith, conceived in religious, political, and/or economic
 terms. Rationalists appeal to reason and moral obligations and advocate prudent
 attempts to pursue constructive international cooperation; but they are usually
 'cautious and agnostic' about any pattern or ultimate meaning in history, aware
 of the unpredictable and contingent and manifesting no confidence in the
 permanence of any apparent progress in political institutions (pp. 29, i6i).
 These philosophical approaches to history are, Wight argued, consistent with
 each tradition's methodological inclination. Realists are prone to make socio-
 logical statements on the basis of an empirical analysis of history. 'For example:
 Machiavelli's "armed prophets [Moses, Hitler] conquer; unarmed prophets
 [Savonarola, Trotsky] are destroyed" and Carr's "international order . . . will
 always be the slogan of those who feel strong enough to impose it on others"'
 (p. 21). Revolutionists are attracted to imperative prescriptions, whether of
 church doctrine, the Rights of Man, the proletariat, or another cause, such as
 'Workers of the world, unite', in The Communist Manifesto (pp. 22-23).
 Rationalists tend to make ontological, or a priori, assertions about the nature and
 purpose of international obligations, such as the preamble to the United Nations
 Charter, written by Field Marshal J. C. Smuts: 'We the peoples of the United
 Nations, determined ... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
 dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women
 and of nations large and small' (p. 22).
 Another charge that Bull lodged against Wight was a 'failure to deal with the
 history of thought about economic aspects of International Relations'.23 It
 would be more accurate to say that Wight dealt with economic questions to the
 extent that he found them relevant to the political philosophers and policy-
 23 Ibid., p. I I2.
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 makers he surveyed. In the Rationalist tradition, for instance, commerce forms
 part of international 'customary society', and Rationalists have seen trade as one
 proof, among others, that 'at any given moment the greater part of the totality
 of international relationships reposes on custom rather than force' (p. 39).
 Marxist-Leninists have, of course, been ideologically committed to the
 principle of economic class struggle, and have devised doctrines such as 'the
 uneven development of capitalism' to account for unanticipated events (pp.
 107-l08). 'Soft' Revolutionists such as Cobden and Bright drew inspiration
 from Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' and held (much as Kant had argued in some
 works) that laissez-faire conirmerce would elevate living conditions and standards
 of education while deepening international 'material, interdependence', and
 would thus enhance the power of 'moral suasion' in world public opinion (pp.
 114-5, 144, 202, 263). Realists, Rationalists and Revolutionists have long
 differed about how to define and calibrate the economic elements of national
 power (and about how to assess the balance of power), Wight noted, owing in
 part to what Cobden described as the 'silent and peaceful aggrandisements
 which spring from improvement and labour' (p. 175).24
 Finally, the charge of 'pessimism' must be considered. Bull judged that 'Martin
 Wight's view of International Relations has as its central characteristic his
 pessimism'.25 This judgement was based on Wight's consistent view that 'Inter-
 national politics is the realm of recurrence and repetition; it is the field in which
 political action is most regularly necessitous'. It is thus, Wight concluded,
 'incompatible with progressivist theory'.26 Wight summarized Kant's arguments
 in Eternal Peace for progress and ultimate success in the elimination of war and
 commented: 'It is surely not a good argument for a theory of international
 politics that we shall be driven to despair if we do not accept it.'27 Wight held
 that 'War is inevitable, but particular wars can be avoided. This means living with
 endless uncertainties and crises.'28 Michael Nicholson and others have deplored
 Wight's lack of faith in progress in the development of theoretical analyses of
 international politics that would enable humanity 'to avoid war' and build 'a
 pe'aceful world'. In Nicholson's words, 'My real complaint against Martin Wight
 is that he made pessimism respectable in British [studies ofl international
 relations'.29
 While it is unreasonable to reproach Wight for not accomplishing what he did not undertake, the
 economic-and demographic-factors that may underlie consciously formulated and articulated rationales
 for decisions deserve more study. Among other sources in this regard, seeJohn Maynard Keynes, The
 general theory of employment, interest and money (London: Macmillan, I936), pp. 348, 38I-4; William H.
 McNeill, Population and politics since 1750 (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, I990),
 pp. 20-I, 4I, 5I, 57, 70; and Andrew W. Marshall, 'Strategy as a profession for future generations', in
 Andrew W. Marshall, J. J. Martin and Henry S. Rowen, eds, On not confusing ourselves: essays on nationtal
 security strategy in honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter (Boulder, CO: Westview, I99I), pp. 302-I I.
 25 Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. ii.
 26 Wight, 'Why is there no international theory?', p. 26.
 27 Ibid., pp. 27-8.
 28 Wight, Power politics, I978 ed, p. I43.
 29 Nicholson, 'The enigma of Martin Wight', pp. 20, 22. For similar criticisms, reproaching Wight for his
 doubts about the possibility of 'progressive' change in international politics, see Roy E. Jones, 'The myth
 of the special case in international relations', Review of International Studies I4, Oct. 1988, pp. 267-74.
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 The lectures confirm Wight's rejection of theories that posit the feasibility of
 eliminating war. Wight's own views appear to have been closest to those of the
 Rationalists, as noted above. In the lectures, Wight indicated that the Rationalist
 tradition has tended to accept war 'as a normal expression of human nature,
 although also a detestable one, and to engage in a consideration of how it can be
 mitigated and limited' (p. 207). Wight implicitly regretted an apparent long-
 term erosion of support for this approach: 'Rationalism, which used to be an
 orthodox, traditional, and respectable school of international theory, has grown
 steadily weaker, steadily dissolved, shedding its strength and support to the
 schools on the flanks'-that is, Realism and Revolutionism of various types (pp.
 266-7). The combination of these trends did not imply any lessening of the
 probability or severity of war, in Wight's view. Indeed, 'the democratization of
 domestic life has made Realpolitik fanatical. Increasingly since I789 wars have
 been revolutionary wars inflicting revolution as well as defeat on the
 vanquished.' (p. 265).
 These conclusions can only be described as 'pessimistic' from a perspective
 that assumes the feasibility of abolishing war. As Wight once wrote, 'inter-
 national theory that remains true to diplomatic experience will be at a discount
 in an age when the belief in progress is prevalent' .30 Wight lacked the 'optimism'
 expressed by Kant and others in the Revolutionist tradition, but he also rejected
 the 'pessimism' about the human condition manifest in the Realist tradition.
 The Rationalist tradition can be seen as one of prudent and restrained 'opti-
 mism' in that it argues for upholding ethical ideals and for efforts to prevent and
 limit wars, in full recognition that such efforts will sometimes fail.
 It is more reasonable to admit that Wight's glass of hope is half full than to
 complain that it is not overflowing. The second half of the statement cited earlier
 ('War is inevitable, but particular wars can be avoided') can be seen as an
 expression of confidence in the ability of policy-makers to gain their ends
 without war on some occasions. 'It is the task of diplomacy to circumvent the
 occasions of war, and to extend the series of circumvented occasions . .. [but]
 The notion that diplomacy can eradicate the causes of war was part of the great
 illusion after J9J9.31 In the Rationalist tradition, only limited and temporary
 progress is feasible, not final victory over war and injustice. 'As the French
 philosopher Julien Benda has said, mankind has always betrayed its obligations,
 but so long as it continues to acknowledge and believe in them, the crack is kept
 open through which civilization can creep. '32
 30 Wight, 'Why is there no international theory?', p. 26.
 31 Wight, Power politics, I978 ed, p. I37.
 32 Ibid., p. 293. (This chapter was reproduced without change from the original 1946 edition.) See also
 Wight, 'Western values in international relations', pp. I30-3I.
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 Comparing Wight's analysis with other interpretations
 Several chronological surveys of the history of Western thought about inter-
 national relations have been prepared,33 but relatively few attempts have been
 made to discern patterns and identify coherent traditions or schools of thought
 over centuries. When such attempts have been made, the tendency has been to
 organize the material into two categories. F. S. Northedge, for example, divided
 Western philosophers since antiquity into 'conservatives' and 'abolitionists',
 defined respectively as 'those who regard war as inevitable, perhaps even desir-
 able, and those who consider it an evil capable of being replaced by lasting peace
 through good will or improved social arrangements'.34 In a Europe-centred
 analysis of the period since I500, Michael Howard reviewed how various
 'liberal' thinkers have, with uneven success, opposed the tenets of 'power politics
 and raison d'etat' in efforts to limit, prevent or abolish war.35 In a review of US
 foreign policy over two centuries, Paul Seabury divided the analysts and policy-
 makers into 'realists' and 'idealists'. 36
 These scholars and others have provided evidence to support a twofold
 differentiation and have called attention to subcategories as well. Wight's tripar-
 tite analysis, however, suggests ways in which the value of such studies could be
 enhanced. The findings of Northedge and Howard, for instance, could be
 enriched in the light of Wight's analysis. Wight suggested, it will be recalled, a
 useful distinction between Realists who have endorsed and even celebrated war
 as a matter of principle, Rationalists who have tried to limit the scope, duration
 and effects of wars that cannot be avoided, and certain Revolutionists who have
 sought to eliminate war entirely.
 One of the examples Seabury presented to illustrate a polarity between
 'realism' and 'idealism' in the history of US foreign relations concerned policy
 debates in the Roosevelt administration before and during the Second World
 War. In Seabury's account, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War
 Henry Stimson 'perceived the war oppositely through idealist and realist glasses'.
 According to Seabury:
 To Hull, a convinced idealist and a Wilsonian, the Axis Powers were distinguished by
 the lawless character of their behavior, by their acts of aggression, by their contempt for
 contractual agreements, and by their autocratic or totalitarian regimes ... Stimson and
 others, however, perceived the war as realists had seen World War I: Hitler's
 domination of Europe and Japan's of Asia would mean that on both continents the
 33 Recent examples include F. Parkinson, The philosophy of international relations: a study in the history of
 thought (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, I977) and Torbjorn L. Knutsen, A history of international
 relations theory (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, I992).
 34 F. S. Northedge, 'Peace, war, and philosophy', in Paul Edwards, ed., The encyclopedia of philosophy, vol. 6
 (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, I967), pp. 63-7.
 35 Michael Howard, War and the liberal conscience (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, I978),
 esp. pp. I30-5.
 36 Paul Seabury, 'Realism and idealism', in Alexander DeConde, ed., Encyclopedia ofAmericanforeign policy:
 studies of the principal movements and ideas (New York: Scribner's, I978), pp. 856-66.
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 balance of power would disappear; America would find itself locked between two
 powerful giants. Radicals like [Vice-President] Henry Wallace . . . put forward the
 notion that the true purpose of the wartime alliance was not merely the elimination of
 fascism from the world but also the establishment of freedom for all peoples, the
 triumph of democracy, and the elimination of poverty and hunger everywhere.37
 Rather than describing these views as a 'tension between idealism and realism',
 with Wallace's idealism more radical than that of Hull, it is more illuminating to
 consider Hull's views as consistent with the Rationalist tradition of upholding
 constitutional governments and international law, Stimson's views as
 representative of the Realist tradition of placing power considerations and
 security interests first, and Wallace's views as faithful to the Revolutionist
 impulse to envision a fundamental transformation of international politics
 towards a harmonious community of mankind as a whole.
 In the lectures Wight indicated that one of his objectives was to illustrate the
 shortcomings and deficiencies of 'two-schools' analyses of the theory of inter-
 national relations. Wight gave as examples E. H. Carr, with his division between
 realists and utopians,38 and Hans Morgenthau, with his realists and idealists.
 'Morgenthau implicitly admits that the two-schools scheme breaks down when
 he allows a category of statesmen with whom there is mysterious coincidence
 between what moral law demands and what national interest requires' (p. 267).
 The examples offered by Morgenthau consisted mainly of statesmen such as
 Gladstone and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who held views (at least on some topics)
 that Wight classified as falling within the Rationalist tradition.39
 Although Wight cited several British and US examples as representative of the
 Rationalist tradition, he did not draw a clear distinction between Anglo-
 American and continental European theorists. In other words, Wight's analysis
 did not draw on or support the distinction advanced by Arnold Wolfers, who
 held that 'While the Continentals were arguing about the dilemma of statesmen
 faced by the irreconcilable demands of necessity and morality, English and
 American thinkers in turn were engaged in a debate about the best way of
 applying accepted principles of morality to the field of foreign policy'. Wolfers
 acknowledged that 'men like Hobbes, Bacon, Bolingbroke, Hamilton, or
 Mahan, usually characterized as conservatives, realists, and pessimists . . . stood
 closer to Machiavelli than to the moralists of their own countries, and . . .
 concurred with views of their Continental contemporaries'. Wolfers argued,
 however, that 'even among these representative exponents of what is now often
 referred to as the power-political school of thought', significant emphasis was
 37 Ibid., p. 862.
 38 E. H. Carr, The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations (London:
 Macmillan, I939).
 39 The reference alludes to Hans J. Morgenthau, In defense of the national interest (New York: Knopf, I95 I),
 p. I9.
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 devoted to 'the moral aspects of political choice'.40 In Wight's analysis, in
 contrast, the views of British and US analysts and policy-makers are grouped
 with those of continental Europeans in each of the three traditions.41
 On the other hand, Wight reached conclusions parallel to those of Wolfers
 regarding the importance of security as a virtual precondition for perceiving
 moral opportunities. Wolfers attributed the differences he discerned between
 Anglo-American philosophies of 'choice' and continental European philo-
 sophies of 'necessity' to the greater vulnerability to attack of the continental
 nations. An 'insular location', Wolfers maintained, gave Britain and the United
 States 'freedom to remain aloof from many international struggles without a
 sacrifice of national security, and thus . . . the chance of keeping one's hands
 clean of many of the morally more obnoxious vicissitudes of power politics to
 which others were subjected'.42
 Wight underscored the importance of power as well as location in providing
 security, however, and argued that:
 It is particularly necessary to guard against the notion that morality in politics is a
 flower that blooms especially or exclusively in Anglo-Saxon gardens. The first thing to
 remember about the policies of Gladstone and Franklin Roosevelt is that Gladstone's
 Britain and Roosevelt's America were dominant powers. This will remind us of the
 great truth that morality in international politics is not simply a matter of civilized
 tradition, but is equally the result of security . . . Once security is destroyed, all the
 higher objects of politics are swallowed up in the struggle for self-preservation, a
 tendency seen in every war.43
 Wight's work is also significant because it complements and deepens
 appreciation of the best-known analysis of the history of Western thought about
 international politics based on a tripartite organization-Kenneth Waltz's classic
 Man, the state and war. Waltz, it will be recalled, grouped ideas into three 'images'
 of the causes of war: first-image theorists emphasized human nature, second-
 image theorists the internal structure of states and third-image theorists
 international anarchy. The analyses by Waltz and Wight agree on several points:
 a two-schools approach is 'misleading' because it oversimplifies complex
 realities;44 a sound understanding of the dynamics of international politics must
 40 Arnold Wolfers, 'Political theory and international relations', in Discord and collaboration: essays on
 international politics (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, I962), pp. 244, 246-7. This
 essay was originally published as the introduction to Arnold Wolfers and Laurence W. Martin, eds, The
 Anglo-American tradition in foreign affairs (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, I956).
 41 It may be significant, however, that continental Europeans-French, German and Russian-supply most
 of Wight's examples of force-oriented 'hard' Revolutionism, while Britons and Americans are often cited
 as espousing 'soft' Revolutionism, based on principles such as free trade and the moral power of world
 public opinion.
 42 Wolfers, 'Political theory and international relations', pp. 245-6.
 43 Wight, Power politics, I978 ed, p. 292.
 44 Kenneth A. Waltz, Man, the state and war: a theoretical analysis (New York: Columbia University Press,
 I959), p. 36.
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 be based on a combination of all three categories (images in Waltz's case,
 traditions in Wight's case);45 each category is based on strongly emphasizing a
 certain aspect of reality, so much so that it decisively influences the interpre-
 tation of events;46 each of the three main categories involves subcategories and
 finer distinctions;47 and the thinking of individuals may well transcend 'ideal
 type' categories.48
 Moreover, some of Wight's Revolutionists are comparable to Waltz's second-
 image theorists in that they champion ideological uniformity in the organi-
 zation of states. Waltz's distinction between the 'optimistic noninterventionism'
 of figures such as Kant, Cobden and Bright, and the 'messianic interventionism'
 of Mazzini, Wilson and the communists might be compared to Wight's dist-
 inction between 'soft' and 'hard' Revolutionists, although Wight discriminated
 more explicitly between liberal democratic and dictatorial types of active
 interventionism.49 Similarly, some of Wight's Realists appear in Waltz's analysis as
 first-image theorists, because of their emphasis on the imperfections of human
 nature (such as Spinoza),50 or as third-image theorists, because of their
 preoccupation with international anarchy (such as Machiavelli and Hobbes)."5
 However, few of the philosophers and policy-makers whom Wight discussed
 at some length as examples of an essentially Rationalist outlook figure
 prominently in Waltz's analysis. The index to Waltz's book includes no references
 to Suarez, Grotius or Burke; and Locke and Gladstone are each mentioned only
 once.52 The explanation may well reside in the fact that Waltz organized his
 analysis around the question, 'Where are the major causes of war to be found?' 53
 As Wight observed, 'It is not characteristic of the Rationalist tradition to
 speculate about the "causes of war"' (p. 207). The Rationalist tradition accepts
 war as a deplorable but ineradicable reality of international politics that must be
 contained, controlled and directed, in so far as this is possible, to morally and
 politically acceptable ends. Waltz described his conclusion as 'realistic,' in that he
 excluded the remedy of world government as 'unattainable in practice'; but it
 might also be considered Rationalist, in that he argued that even governments
 'whose ends are worthy and whose means are fastidious' must reckon with the
 risk of war, given international anarchy.54
 45 Ibid., pp. I 4, 23 8.
 46 Ibid., pp. Io, i6o, 227.
 47 Ibid., pp. I3, I8-I9, 83-4, I8I-6, 2I9-23.
 48 See Waltz's discussion of Bismarck in ibid., pp. 3, 225-6; of Kant, pp. i6I-5; and of Morgenthau and
 Niebuhr, pp. 33-4I.
 49 Ibid., pp. I03-I4.
 50 Ibid., pp. 2I-4, i6i.
 51 Ibid., p. 7. Waltz, it will be recalled, based much of his analysis of the third image (international
 anarchy) on Rousseau. Wight identified elements of all three traditions in Rousseau's thinking; but
 Wight emphasized Rousseau's inspiration to Revolutionists, recalling Kant's description of Rousseau as
 'the Newton of the moral world' (p. 263).
 52 Ibid., pp. I05, 230.
 5 Ibid., p. I2.
 54 Ibid., p. 238.
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 Some scholars who have recently suggested other arrangements outlining
 patterns or traditions in the history of Western thinking about international
 politics have acknowledged the importance of Wight's work (basing their
 judgements mainly on the accounts of the lectures by Bull and Porter) and have
 felt obliged to justify rejecting Wight's approach. Michael Donelan, for example,
 has proposed arranging the historical material into five 'ways of thought'-
 natural law, realism, fideism, rationalism and historicism-on the grounds that
 'further analysis' (not further described) suggested the advisability of 'inflation'
 beyond Wight's three traditions.55 Martin Ceadel has offered five 'ideal types or
 paradigms', which he has labelled militarism, crusading, defencism, pacific-ism
 and pacifism, to describe the ends and means endorsed by various analysts and
 policy-makers. Even though all rubrics in any system of classification must be
 defined and Ceadel himself has invented new words as labels for two of his own
 categories ('defencism' and 'pacific-ism') that are not readily intelligible without
 some study, Ceadel has asserted that Wight's rubrics of Realism, Revolutionism
 and Rationalism 'were not well chosen'. Ceadel has also declared that 'Wight's
 typology is of little help without its subdivisions', that specific thinkers cannot
 and should not be confined to a single tradition and that the traditions 'can lead
 also to a running together of the views of simnilar but far from identical
 thinkers'.56 Wight himself made all the latter points in the lectures, of course;
 and these objections apply with almost as much force to an arrangement with
 five main categories as to one with three.57 Neither Donelan nor Ceadel
 identifies any significant shortcomings in the intellectual architecture proposed
 by Wight.
 Theory might be defined as a quest for truth in the form of general principles
 that are consistent, to the maximum extent possible, with historical accuracy.
 Most generalizations, however, involve some simplification and hence some
 injustice to the complexity of a specific historical context and the richness of a
 specific thinker's ideas. The three traditions identified and analysed by Wight are
 no exception, as he pointed out. Wight's organization of the ideas is nonetheless
 more faithful to the intricate and elusive historical realities in question-and less
 unjust to specific thinkers and patterns of thought-than many other arrange-
 ments that have been proposed. The traditions outlined by Wight encompass all
 the major political philosophers of the Western states-system, with most of the
 distinctions well justified and the anomalies and shortcomings inherent in any
 system of classification fully acknowledged.
 5 Michael Donelan, Elements of international political theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I990), pp. I-2.
 56 Martin Ceadel, Thinking about peace and war (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, I987),
 pp. I9, I93-4.
 " A fivefold approach may nonetheless offer advantages regarding some questions, as in the lucid analysis of
 differing views about the justice of war by Inis L. Claude, Jr, 'Just wars: doctrines and institutions',
 Political Science Quarterly 95, Spring I980, pp. 83-96.
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 Eurocentrism and beyond
 The charge by Bull and Porter (and others) that Wight's analysis is 'Eurocentric'
 can scarcely be disputed. Wight has only a few tentative observations to offer on
 traditions of thinking about international relations in India, China and the
 Islamic world, despite his having taken up Tocqueville's challenge 'to rediscover
 . . . the principal ideas in these fields ... in circulation among the human race'.
 On the other hand, Wight's mastery of the Western traditions has rarely been
 equalled, and it is essential to understand these traditions because they have
 shaped international institutions and general attitudes and policies, even (to
 some extent) in non-Western societies, owing to Western dominance during the
 expansion of the Europe-centred states-system from the fifteenth century to the
 twentieth.
 The legacy of Western dominance includes the main institutions of the states-
 system today, such as diplomatic practices and international law, the United
 Nations and other global organizations, and international commercial and
 financial procedures. Wight's analysis of the major Western traditions of thought
 could form an excellent basis for further scholarly enquiry into the question of
 the universality of patterns of thinking about these institutions. To what extent,
 for example, are values nominally endorsed by all members of the United
 Nations (in the UN Charter and in other basic documents, such as the I948
 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, many composed mainly by Western
 officials during and after the Second World War) consistent with the predom-
 inant traditions of thinking about international relations in specific countries
 and culture-regions? What evidence might be found to support a hypothesis that
 many people in particular countries and/or culture-regions regard nominally
 universal institutions and values quite differently, owing in part to their distinct
 traditions? In what ways (and to what degree) might long-standing Western-
 derived international institutions and standards of behaviour be modified under
 the continuing impact of non-Western traditions?58
 Wight's analysis of Western traditions could furnish a baseline for exploring
 traditions in non-European societies. To what extent may parallels to the main
 Western traditions be identified? In what ways do specific non-Western
 traditions differ? How might the differences be explained? Wight's assertion,
 supported solely by a reference to the Realism in Kautilya, that 'in Hindu
 political thinking there is no Rationalist tradition' (p. i io) might be critically
 examined through a historical survey of Indian theory and practice as acute and
 extensive as that which Wight prepared regarding the West. Wight's tentative
 sketch of possible parallels in Chinese philosophy to the three main traditions he
 discerned in the West (pp. 66-9) might form a point of departure for an in-
 depth analysis of the history of China's traditions regarding international
 58 For contrasting views on such questions, see Adda Bozeman, 'The international order in a multicultural
 world', in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds, The expansion of international society (Oxford: Clarendon
 Press, I984) and R. J. Vincent, Human rights and international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
 Press, I986).
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 politics. The framework provided by Wight's lectures could thus be used as a
 conceptual instrument for cross-cultural comparative studies regarding elites,
 nations, states-systems or culture-regions.
 The charge of Eurocentrism should be placed in perspective by considering
 the amount of attention Wight devoted to European interactions with non-
 Western societies. The longest chapter in the book, entitled 'Theory of
 mankind: "barbarians"' draws on Wight's extensive work on the legal and
 administrative history of British colonialism, and on the history of the global
 extension of the Europe-centred Western states-system. Wight expressed great
 respect for non-European societies and implicit outrage regarding their
 exploitation and, in many cases, their 'extermination' by Western colonizers. In
 his account of the debates over the centuries in Western societies about how
 'barbarians' should be treated, it is clear that Wight aligned himself with the
 Rationalist theorists-beginning with sixteenth-century Spanish theologians
 and jurists such as Suarez, Las Casas and Vitoria-who held that indigenous
 peoples had rights, including rights to property and freedom of conscience, that
 should be respected (pp. 22, 69-70).
 Wight pointed out that these principles were often not observed, partly
 because of the prevalence of far older traditions of Realism that, beginning with
 the ancient Greeks, held that 'barbarians' have no rights. Wight gave examples
 such as the medieval German expansion against the Slavs and 'Cromwell's
 massacres in Ireland (pp. 52-5) before turning to more recent events. As Wight
 observed,
 That barbarians are not human followed easily from the doctrine that they have no rights;
 indeed it was its premise . . . Three policies are likely to follow on from the idea that
 certain types are sub-human: if tractable and muscular, they will be enslaved; if
 intractable and useless, exterminated; and if there are too many to be exterminated and
 they are difficult to organize they will be segregated. The most obvious example of
 enslavement is of course the transatlantic slave trade, when ten million were uprooted.
 (p. 62, emphasis in original)
 Even Rationalists, Wight noted, came to justify imperialism and the
 colonization of 'barbarian'-that is, non-European-regions of the world. The
 method was to assert that, while 'barbarians' had rights, these were 'not full
 rights, not equal rights, but appropriate rights' (p. 79). This approach
 transformed the concept of 'trusteeship' into a right to rule others.
 For Locke it is a doctrine justifying a community in getting rid of a ruler whom
 members of the community had contracted to set over their affairs; for Burke it is a
 doctrine justifying a community in thrusting its rule upon barbarians who had never
 asked for it. For Locke, it means the right of rebellion; for Burke, it means the right of
 empire. (p. 76)
 Even though this right meant, for Burke and many other Rationalists, a duty
 to govern colonies honestly and responsibly, it is evident that Wight had no
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 sympathy for the 'paternalist' argument that would allow European colonial
 powers alone to determine when non-European peoples were fit for inde-
 pendence. Wight cited with approval Gladstone's principle that 'It is liberty
 alone that makes men fit for liberty' (p. 8 i).
 It is surprising in this regard that Bull accused Wight of 'insensitivity about
 non-Western peoples and their aspirations'. Bull's charge was based in part on
 what Bull called Wight's 'comparison between the Afro-Asian powers and the
 revisionist powers of the I93OS'.59 Now that Wight's lectures have at last been
 published, it is evident that this comparison formed part of a broader discussion
 of 'have-not' powers expressing resentment against the patronizing attitudes of
 superiority manifest in established Western powers (pp. 89-go). Indeed, rather
 than equating the aggrieved victims of colonization with fascists, Wight likened
 European colonialism to Hitler's conquests in Europe:
 The doctrine that barbarians have no rights was reimported by Hitler from the frontiers
 to the centre of international society, and vividly expressed when in March I939 he
 erected Bohemia into a protectorate. Britain and other powers had invented these
 categories for handling barbarian nations; Hitler too would have his colonial empire in
 the very middle of Europe, reducing many 'famous and ancient states of Europe' [in
 Churchill's phrase] to rightlessness, since they were Slav barbarians [in Nazi doctrine].
 The deepest reason why the West was shocked by Hitler was his introducing colonial
 methods of power politics, their own colonial methods, into [intra-European] inter-
 national relations. Non-European nations could not share European horror at Hitler's
 methods, even his massacre of the Jews: the Second World War was for them a
 European civil war and its methods they had seen before. (p. 6i)
 The Revolutionist approach to 'barbarians' has largely triumphed since I945.
 This is the doctrine that 'barbarians have equal rights' (p. 83). Anticolonialism
 has asserted the 'absolute right to freedom' (p. 86) of colonized peoples; but it
 has taken different forms, owing in part to the differences in the policies of the
 various colonial powers. The French pursued, Wight noted, the 'antithesis of
 British colonial policy', in that the French sought the assimilation of their
 colonial subjects and were 'sublimely incapable of distinguishing between the
 universal Rights of Man and French culture' (p. 9i). In contrast, in the case of
 the USSR, 'in theory, there is no identification between Communist doctrine
 and Russian national culture', although 'perhaps in practice Soviet colonial
 policy is a policy of Russification, as was the Tsarist policy' (p. 95).
 Now that the Soviet Union, in some respects the last major European colonial
 empire, has disintegrated, the questions raised by Wight's analysis are quite
 timely. In the early I95os George F. Kennan outlined what Wight called a
 'superbly Rationalist' agenda of preferred future Russian policies-an abandon-
 ment of subversive and revolutionary goals regarding foreign governments, an
 end to excessive internal authoritarianism, and a halt to the oppression of
 5 Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. I 15.
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 peoples capable of national independence. Wight dismissed this hopeful vision
 as 'completely unrealist ... and . .. remote from attainability'. (pp. 132-3)
 The central questions can still be usefully posed in Wightean terms. Assuming
 that the Russian federation can avoid fragmentation and civil war, what
 approach will Moscow adopt toward its former dominions? Will Russia's
 dealings with the other former Soviet republics be based on Rationalist (or
 Grotian) principles, implying democratization and the development of relations
 of mutual respect, regulated largely by international law? Or will the Russians
 pursue harsh Realist (or Machiavellian) policies, seeking to dominate several, if
 not all, of their weaker neighbours or even to incorporate them into a new
 empire or sphere of influence? Might the Russians even attempt to devise a new
 quasi-Revolutionist ideology to furnish a legitimacy principle for such an
 empire? In view of Russia's past and the discrediting of Marxism-Leninism, this
 might be an anti-Western messianic ideology, driven in part by a determination
 to maintain Russia's great power status, perhaps with strands of authoritarianism,
 Russian national chauvinism, Orthodoxy, and/or pan-Slavism.
 The foreign policies of former colonies, including relations with the erstwhile
 metropole, also deserve more analysis in a comparative perspective. To what extent
 have differences in European colonial practices (British, French, Spanish,
 Portuguese, Russian, etc.) had distinct side-effects? If, for example, many of the
 African states that were formerly French colonies have retained unusually close
 political, economic and military ties to Paris, to what extent have their elites
 been acculturated into French traditions of statecraft? To what extent have
 fundamental concepts about international politics in formerly colonized states
 been influenced by a metropole's traditions, as opposed to indigenous ones? If
 nations formerly dominated by Soviet Russia retain their independence, what
 will be the effects of the decades (or centuries) of Russian dominance on their
 political culture regarding international relations?
 In short, Wight's 'Eurocentric' focus on Western traditions of dealing with
 'barbarians' may paradoxically blaze the trail for valuable analyses combining
 historical and theoretical research about more general questions regarding
 colonialism and relations with vulnerable 'barbarians'. What theories have
 prevailed within non-Western colonial empires? What traditions have the Chi-
 nese, for example, had towards 'barbarians'? In what ways have they paralleled
 and differed from the main Western traditions, and how may they affect current
 and future decisions about the non-Chinese peoples subject to Beijing? When
 in a position of strength and effective authority over non-lslamic peoples, have
 Islamic elites tended to enforce assimilation through mandatory conversion?
 When a policy of relative tolerance has prevailed (during certain periods, for
 instance, in parts of the Ottoman empire), on what theory of relations with
 'barbarians' has this been based?60
 60 Partial answers to these questions may be found in Adam Watson's The evolution of itnternatiotnal society: a
 comparative historical analysis (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), a remarkable and trail-blazing
 study, based in part on the work of Martin Wight, regarding ancient states-systems and the origins and
 history of the modern, originally Europe-centred, states-system.
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 Wight's analysis of Western traditions also offers a firm basis for building on
 his work and that of others about the dynamics of change within states-systems.
 David Armstrong's valuable new study, for example, examines the interactions
 between revolutionary states-e.g., Revolutionary France, Bolshevik Russia,
 Sukarno's Indonesia, Castro's Cuba and communist China-and what he calls
 'the Westphalian conception of international society'. Armstrong suggests that
 such states usually set out with 'a teleological view of world politics ... some
 iron law of history which they are uniquely privileged to perceive'. At length,
 however, a 'socialization' process takes place: 'an initial hostility towards these
 institutions of international society' yields 'to a grudging acceptance of their
 value' in ensuring access to the prerogatives associated with statehood and
 61
 sovereignty.
 In Wightean terms, Revolutionist ardour is qualified as such governments
 recognize the advantages of the Grotian framework of international intercourse.
 Armstrong also finds that Revolutionary states nonetheless have leavened 'the
 Westphalian conception' by introducing new standards of international legiti-
 macy such as national self-determination, constitutional government and a legal
 order protecting basic human rights.62 Wight sketched such interactions bet-
 ween the states-system and revolutionary regimes in his chapter on international
 legitimacy in Systems of states.63 Wight's lectures, however, complement this
 work and important new studies such as Armstrong's by providing a lucid
 framework for understanding the arguments articulated by revolutionary states
 and by the defenders of the 'Westphalian conception', both Realists and
 Rationalists.64
 The merits of Wight's analysis
 In 1977, Stanley Hoffmann suggested that studies of international relations in
 the United States could benefit from 'triple distance . . . away from the
 contemporary, toward the past; [away] from the perspective of a superpower
 (and a highly conservative one), toward that of the weak and the revolutionary
 . . .; [and away] from the glide into policy science, back to the steep ascent
 toward the peaks which the questions raised by traditional political philosophy
 represent'.65 These suggestions have been followed to some extent, with works
 61 David Armstrong, Revolution and world order: the revolutionary state in international society (Oxford:
 Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 301-2.
 62 Ibid., pp. 304-8.
 63 Wight, Systems of states, pp. 153-73.
 64 Incidentally, one of the several merits of Armstrong's study is his perceptive discussion of the differences
 between 'regime theories' and the 'international society' approach associated with authorities such as
 Wight and Bull. Armstrong, Revolution and world order, pp. 308-9. See also Barry Buzan, 'From
 international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English
 school', International Organization 47, Summer 1993, pp. 327-52, and the recent analysis of Bull's work
 in this regard by lan Harris, 'Order and Justice in The anarchical society', International Affairs 69:4, Oct.
 1993, pp. 725-41.
 65 Stanley Hoffmann, 'An American social science: international relations', injanus and Minerva: essays in the
 theory and practice of international politics (Boulder, CO, and London: Westview, 1987), p. 23. (This essay
 was originally published in Daedalus, Summer 1977.)
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 bridging the gap between history and theory,66 area studies striving to overcome
 US ethnocentrism,67 and analyses examining the cogency and continuing
 relevance of the theories about international politics advanced by great political
 philosophers.68
 Martin Wight's analysis of the main Western traditions of thinking about
 international relations could, however, offer a solid touchstone for further
 enquiries. As suggested above with regard to Wight's 'Eurocentrism', for
 example, his approach offers a general framework to help in the analysis of what
 has been called the 'strategic culture' of specific culture-regions, nations or
 elites.69 Indeed, examining views about certain key ideas involved in these
 traditions could form part of analyses of the thinking and attitudes-the
 operational code' or 'strategic personality'-of specific decision-makers or
 groups of policy-makers, and could furnish insights about probable decisions
 regarding strategy, arms control and other matters.70 The traditions also offer a
 matrix of great analytical and pedagogical value to place current debates about
 foreign and security policy and international order into historical and
 philosophical perspective. Wight's analysis, moreover, obviously constitutes a
 framework for studies of specific philosophers who made substantial
 contributions to the corpus of theory about international politics.71
 Broader questions also deserve attention. For instance, was Wight's threefold
 analysis of the Western traditions original? Bull wrote that it was 'profoundly
 original. There is one passage in Gierke's account of the natural law tradition in
 which the germ of the idea is stated, but I have seen no evidence that Wight
 was aware of this passage and in any case it does not entail the great structure of
 66 Notable examples may be found in the series of Princeton Studies in International History and
 Politics-for instance, Philip H. Gordon's fine study, A certain idea of France: French security policy and the
 Gaullist legacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
 67 For useful discussions, see Richard J. Samuels and Myron Weiner, eds, The political culture offoreign area and
 international studies: essays in honor of Lucian W. Pye (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1992).
 68 For perceptive analyses examining Kantian theories in the light of historical experience, see Michael W.
 Doyle, 'Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, Summer i983, pp.
 205-35, and Fall i983, pp. 323-53; and his 'Liberalism and world politics', American Political Science
 Review 80, Dec. i986, pp. 115i-69.
 69 On 'strategic culture', see among other sourcesJack L. Snyder, 'The concept of strategic culture: caveat
 emptor', and Ken Booth, 'The concept of strategic culture affirmed', both in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed.,
 Strategic power: USA/USSR (New York: St Martin's Press, I990); Yitzhak Klein, 'A theory of strategic
 culture', Comparative Strategy, vol. Io, no. I, 1991, pp. 3-23; and Stephen Peter Rosen, 'The problem of
 strategy and culture', forthcoming. See also Samuel P. Huntington, 'The clash of civilizations?', Foreign
 Affairs 72, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49, and the articles commenting on this essay in subsequent issues.
 70 Alexander L. George, The 'operational code': a neglected approach to the study ofpolitical leaders and decision-
 making, RM-5427-PR (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, Sept. i967). On the concept of 'strategic personality',
 see Robert D. Blackwill and Ashton B. Carter, 'The role of intelligence', in Robert D. Blackwill and
 Albert Carnesale, eds, New nuclear nations: consequencesfor US policy (New York: Council on Foreign
 Relations Press, 1993), pp. 2I6-50.
 71 For a discussion of Wight's framework with reference to Grotius, see Benedict Kingsbury and Adam
 Roberts, 'Introduction: Grotian thought in international relations', in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury
 and Adam Roberts, eds, Hugo Grotius and international relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I990), pp. 6-
 IO, I4, 54-60. R. J. Vincent also found Wight's architecture useful in his studies of specific thinkers and
 their significance, notably 'The Hobbesian tradition in twentieth century international thought',
 Millennium:Journal of International Studies I0, Summer 198I, pp. 9I-IOI and 'Edmund Burke and the
 theory of international relations', Review of International Studies IO, July I984, pp. 205-2I 8.
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 ideas which, when fuliy grown in his mind, it became. '72 Wight did, however,
 cite Gierke's famous work repeatedly in these lectures (pp. 72, ioo) and in other
 works; and he recommended it to students in a reading list (p. 27I).73 K. J.
 Holsti has written that, although they used 'somewhat different labels', Gierke,
 Wight and Bull 'have ali summarized the main world images under the rubrics
 ,74 of the Hobbesian, Grotian, and Kantian traditions'.
 The origins of the conception are, of course, less important than the origins
 of the traditions themselves. Gierke, Wight and Bull agreed that the genesis was
 during the period from the fourteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, when
 the universal institutions of Western Christendom, the papacy and the Holy
 Roman Empire, were losing authority to the nascent modern states. Some
 thinkers (Realists, in Wight's terminology) emphasized the competition
 between autonomous states, while others (Revolutionists) sought to restore
 papal and imperial authority, what Gierke calied 'the unsubstantial ghost of the
 old imperium mundi'. But a third group (Rationalists) held, in Gierke's words,
 that 'there was a natural-law connection between all nations, and that this
 connection, while it did not issue in any authority exercised by the Whole over
 ,75
 its parts, at any rate involved a system of mutual social rights and duties'.
 If the three traditions emerged in conjunction with the modern states-system
 over four hundred years ago, is it possible that other patterns of thinking might
 be more influential in other types of states-systems? Wight offered no conclusive
 answers to this question, but repeatedly pointed out that other types of universal
 political organization have at times been dominant in the history of Western
 civilization. 'The political kaleidoscope of the Greek and Helienistic ages looks
 modern to our eyes, while the immense majesty of the Roman peace, and the
 Christian unity of the medieval world, seem remote and alien.'76 He occasionally
 referred to 'the perhaps transient, perhaps expiring, period since the sixteenth
 century in which there has existed this peculiar society composed of sovereign
 states'.77 In the lectures, Wight declared that 'the states-system is now manifestly
 in the same sort of anarchical obsolescence as the feudal kingdoms were when
 Machiavelli was born' (pp. 4-5). Although other theorists have raised the
 72 Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. i i i. Bull referred to Otto von Gierke,
 Natural law and the theory of society 15oo to 18oo, trans. Ernest Barker (Cambridge: Cambridge University
 Press, I950, first publ. I934), p. 85. This work was first published in German in I9I3, the year of
 Wight's birth, and 'had been written some twenty years before', according to Ernest Barker's
 'Introduction', pp. ix-x. Bull reproduced what he deemed the key passage from Gierke in his book,
 The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics (London: Macmillan, I977), p. 28.
 73 Wight especially recommended the essay by Ernst Troeltsch, which was published as an appendix to
 Gierke's book. For other references to Gierke's book by Wight, see 'An anatomy of international thought',
 p. 227 and Systems of states, p. 2I.
 74 K. J. Holsti, The dividing discipline: hegemony and diversity in international theory (Boston: Unwin Hyman,
 I985), pp. 26-7. Holsti, however, cites a different work by Gierke: Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung
 der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien (Aslen: Scientia, I955, first publ. I880).
 75 Gierke, Natural law and the theory of society, p. 85.
 76 Wight, Power politics, I978 edn, p. 24.
 77 Ibid., p. I37.
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 possibility of a 'new medievalism' requiring different principles for action,78
 Wight offered no specific forecast.
 Perhaps the most fundamental question raised by Wight's work concerns the
 kinds of knowledge that can be achieved in theoretical enquiry in international
 relations. Kenneth Waltz has complained that 'Among the depressing features of
 international-political studies is the small gain in explanatory power that has
 come from the large amount of work done in recent decades. Nothing seems to
 accumulate, not even criticism.'79 In response to a similar lament, Hoffmann
 wrote that 'Waltz seems to blame the theorists, rather than asking whether the
 fiasco does not result from the very nature of the field. Can there be a theory of
 undetermined behavior, which is what "diplomatic-strategic action", to use
 [Raymond] Aron's terms, amounts to?'80 The free wills, differing priorities and
 ultimately contingent choices of the many decision-makers in international
 politics place severe limits on the aspirations towards 'prediction' and 'expla-
 nation' held by some scholars. As Hoffmann noted, Aron has 'demonstrated why
 a theory of undetermined behavior cannot consist of a set of propositions
 explaining general laws that make prediction possible, and can do little more
 than define basic concepts, analyze basic configurations, sketch out the perma-
 nent features of a constant logic of behavior, in other words make the field
 intelligible'. 81
 From this perspective, as Bull observed, theoretical work in international
 relations is 'philosophical in character. It does not lead to cumulative knowledge
 after the manner of natural science . . . All of this must foliow once we grant
 Wight's initial assumption that theoretical inquiry into International Relations is
 necessarily about moral or prescriptive questions. '82 Indeed, Wight argued that
 'historical interpretation' is the counterpart of political theory for international
 politics, and wrote that he was tempted to say that 'there is no international
 theory except the kind of rumination about human destiny to which we give
 the unsatisfactory name of philosophy of history'.83 In the lectures, Wight added
 that 'judging the validity of . .. [the] ethical principles [followed by statesmen]
 . . . is not a process of scientific analysis; it is more akin to literary criticism. It
 involves developing a sensitive awareness of the intractability of ali political
 situations, and the moral quandary in which all statecraft operates' (p. 258). To
 78 Wolfers, 'Political theory and international relations', p. 242; Bull, The anarchical society, pp. 254-5, 264-
 76, 285-6. In an important recent interview (Le Monde, 27 Oct. I992), Pierre Hassner discussed the
 possibility that the world is entering 'a new middle ages' [tin nouiveaui Moyen Age], with 'anarchy and
 permanent conflicts', among other factors, placing into question the principles of international order
 dating from the treaty of Westphalia.
 79 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theoty of international politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, I979), p. I8.
 80 Hoffmann, 'An American social science', p. I5; emphasis in original.
 81 Ibid. See also Hoffmann's essay, 'Raymond Aron and the theory of international relations', inJanutls and
 Minerva, pp. 52-69. Wight expressed unqualified admiration for Aron's masterwork Peace anid wvar in his
 review, 'Tract for the nuclear age', The Observer, 23 April I967.
 82 Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. II 4. For a similar view, see Wolfers,
 'Political theory and international relations', p. 249.
 83 Wight, 'Why is there no international theory?', p. 33.
 289
This content downloaded from 205.155.65.226 on Fri, 02 Mar 2018 18:37:06 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 David S. Yost
 develop such an awareness, Wight recommended the study of history, starting
 with Thucydides, and of works of literature by authors such as Conrad, Hardy,
 Koestler, Orweli, Swift and Tolstoy.84
 In short, Wight's lectures encouraged his students to seek greater historical and
 philosophical knowledge. He identified an order in interrelated ideas that
 helped them, and that can help us, to understand better the assumptions,
 arguments and dilemmas associated with each of the main traditions of thinking
 about international politics in the West since Machiavelli. As Wight pointed out,
 such knowledge of the past provides an
 escape from the Zeitgeist, from the mean, narrow, provincial spirit which is constantly
 assuring us that we are at the peak of human achievement, that we stand on the edge
 of unprecedented prosperity or an unparalleled catastrophe . . . It is a liberation of the
 spirit to acquire perspective, to recognize that every generation is confronted by
 problems of the utmost subjective urgency, but that an objective grading is probably
 impossible; to learn that the same moral predicaments and the same ideas have been
 explored before. (p. 6)
 84 Wight's reading suggestions regarding history may be found in 'Why is there no international theory?',
 p. 32. His literature suggestions may be found in International theory: the three traditions (p. 258), which
 also contains a reading list on the three traditions of political philosophy regarding international relations
 (pp. 269-72).
 An edited text of the 1994 Martin Wight Memorial Lecture entitled 'Beyond The Three
 Traditions: the philosophy of war and peace in historical perspective', given by Professor Pierre
 Hassner on 17 March 1994 at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, will be published
 in the October 1994 issue of International Affairs.
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